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CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS: TAXING THE WAIVING
SHAREHOLDER TO THE EXTENT OF DIVIDENDS WAIVED
The Internal Revenue Service has established a policy of ap-
plying the constructive dividend doctrine when a shareholder
waives his right to future undeclared dividends, where no bona fide
business purpose exists for the waiver and where the benefited
shareholder is a relative of the waiving shareholder. The Service
has neither designated the business purposes which are to be re-
garded as legitimate nor announced what policy will prevail
where both a bona fide business purpose and a substantial benefit
to the waiving shareholder's relatives exist. However, case law in
analogous tax areas indicates that the constructive dividend doc-
trine will not be applied where the business purpose is bona fide,
even though the waiver also benefits relatives of the waiving share-
holder.
I NASMUCH as the prospective waiver of future undeclared dividends
by some shareholders of a corporation amounts to a shifting of in-
come among taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service has sought to
tax such shareholders as recipients of a constructive dividend on their
pro rata share of waived dividends,' except when the dividends were
waived for a bona fide business purpose.2 This exception was first
I In order to tax such diversions of corporate earnings to a shareholder's benefit,
courts developed the doctrine of constructive dividends. See, e.g., Sachs v. Commis-
sioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 864 U.S. 833 (1960). See generally
Brafford, The Constructive Receipt of Dividends by Stockholders of a Closely Held
Corporation (pt. 1), 46 KY. L.J. 515 (1958); (pts. 2-3), 47 Ky. L.J. 17, 378 (1958-59).
Much of the force behind the constructive dividend doctrine is found in dicta
enunciated in the famous case of Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), where Mr.
Justice Stone announced that "the power to dispose of income is the equivalent of
ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income
to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization of income by him who ex-
ercises it." Id. at 118. On the basis of Horst it appears that when one shareholder
waives his right to dividends, he may be taxed to the extent of the dividends
waived. Such a waiver may result in either increased dividends to other share-
holders or an increase in the corporate surplus which thereby increases the
value of the corporate stock of all shareholders. In either instance, however, the
shareholder has "disposed" of "his power to have received such funds." See Byers v.
Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273, 275-76 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953).
2 See Rev. Rul. 65-256, 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 46, at 27; Rev. Rul. 56-431, 1956-2
Guss. BULL. 171; Rev. Rul. 45, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 178.
A precondition to applying the doctrine of constructive dividends is a finding of
"earnings and profits" of the corporation which are at least equal to the amount of
the distribution being taxed. Helvering v. Gordon, 87 F.2d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1937).
See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 316 (a).
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recognized by the Service in 1953 in Revenue Ruling 45,3 where the
waiver was made for the purpose of building up surplus to enable
the corporation to meet certain legal requirements regarding con-
templated business needs and where there existed no direct family
or business relationship between the waiving and non-waiving
shareholders. 4 Revenue Ruling 56-431, limited the application of
this exception, however, to the situation where the alleged business
purpose of paying a larger dividend to minority shareholder-em-
ployees to maintain their good will while averting a depletion of
the corporation's working capital. The Service characterized this
situation as producing a merely incidental corporate benefit since
over seventy-one per cent of the non-waiving shares were held by
relatives of the waiving shareholder. Only twenty-nine per cent of
the shares which paid dividends were held by employees of the cor-
poration.6
The bona fide business purpose exception to the constructive
dividend doctrine was recently reaffirmed in Revenue Ruling
65-256.7 That ruling involved a situation in which the majority
shareholder of one of two merging corporations waived a substantial
portion of the dividends for three immediately subsequent years in
order to induce the shareholders of the other merging corporation
to agree to the merger, to obtain voting control of the surviving
corporation and to preserve its working capital. Relatives of the
waiving shareholder who benefited from the waiver held an interest
in the surviving corporation, but only to the extent of 0.06 per cent.
The Service ruled that because the waiver was supported by a
bona fide business purpose and resulted in only insignificant benefits
3 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 178.
'The existence of a family relationship between parties to a transaction offers op-
portunities for tax avoidance schemes because of the mutual trust and informal
cooperation inherent in such a relationship. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 939-40 (1962); see, e.g., Byers v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273-74 (8th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953). When no direct family relationship is involved,
the likelihood that legitimate business reasons have guided the transaction is greatly
increased.
5 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 171.
0 Rev. Rul. 56-431, 1956-2 Cus. BULL. 171, 172.
Although the Service characterized the "primary purpose" for the waiver as an
attempt to accord benefits to the taxpayer's relatives, the ruling appeared to make
no inquiry into motivation or intent. Rather, in assessing the "primary purpose"
of the waiver, the Service ostensibly applied an objective test of net economic benefit
based on all the circumstances. See 1956-2 CuM. BULL. at 172-73.
71965 INT. Ray. BULL. No. 46, at 27.
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to the waiving shareholder's relatives, it would not cause the waiving
shareholder to receive any constructive dividends.$
These three revenue rulings establish a Service policy of applying
the constructive dividend doctrine in situations where no bona fide
business purpose exists to justify the waiver and where the benefited
shareholder is a relative of the waiving shareholder. But the rulings
do not spell out exactly what purposes are bona fide business
purposes, nor do they indicate whether the exception prevails
in cases where both a bona fide business purpose and a substantial
benefit to the waiving shareholder's relatives exist. The taxpayer
must seek an answer to these problems in the case law of analogous
tax areas.
One area in which the business purpose exception has arisen
involves the income tax allocation of a waiver of future dividends
in order to obtain voting power through purchase of non-waiving
shares. In Tucker v. Commissioner,9 an automobile manufacturer
required the managers of corporations holding dealer franchises to
acquire controlling interests therein. In order to induce an un-
related minority shareholder to sell his stock and to thereby acquire
a controlling interest, the manager-taxpayer in Tucker agreed to
cause the corporation to pay twenty per cent of its profits for the
following five years to the minority shareholder. Despite the ob-
jections of the Commissioner, these payments of corporate earnings
were held not to constitute constructive dividends to the manager.1 0
The Tucker holding indicates that an exchange of future dividends
for voting power in order to preserve one of the corporation's most
valuable assets will be viewed as a transaction consummated for a
bona fide business purpose in situations where the parties involved
bargain at arm's length."
"Rev. Rul. 65-256, 1965 INT. REV. BuL.. No. 46, at 28.
' 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955).
10 Id. at 179.
21 Not only has the preservation of a corporation's most valuable asset been held
to be a legitimate corporate purpose, but in Williams & Waddell, Inc. v. Pitts, 148
F. Supp. 778 (E.D.S.C. 1957), the court upheld as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses payments made by the corporation to induce a shareholder to sell her shares
so that a corporate deadlock could be resolved, thereby enabling the corporation
to function as an operative business concern. In Pitts, one of the two corporate
shareholders had died, leaving his fifty per cent stock interest to his wife. A
deadlock ensued concerning who was to be the deceased's replacement in the business,
and the widow finally agreed to sell her stock to a buyer acceptable to all parties
concerned. As consideration in addition to the purchase price, the corporation was
required to pay the widow one hundred dollars monthly for life. These monthly
Vol. 1966: 801)
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The Tucker rule seemingly is not limited to the situation where
the waiving and non-waiving shareholders are unrelated. In Majorie
N. Dean12 the shareholders of a corporation had adopted a plan
whereby women who inherited voting stock in the corporation
had the option to surrender that stock in exchange for non-voting
cumulative preferred stock upon profitable terms. The purpose
of the plan was to induce inexperienced women shareholders to
forego attempts to become involved in the management of the
corporation, thereby placing the corporation in a better position
to attract new executive talent.13 The court held that the plan
qualified as nontaxable reorganization 4 although it involved pro-
visions which were equivalent to a partial waiver of future dividends
on the part of the remaining holders of voting stock, since the pre-
ferred stock was to receive a greater proportionate share of dividends.
Significantly, Dean involved a direct family relationship, as two
of the women receiving dividend preference were the sister and
niece of the corporation's chief executive officer, the latter holding
only non-preferred shares in the corporation. 5
Similar to the exchange of dividend rights for voting rights is
a waiver of future dividends by one shareholder to enable another
shareholder to sell out to a new party and thus avert corporate liqui-
dation. The case of United States v. Carey16 provides some support
for the contention that this transaction represents a valid business
purpose and thus would not subject the waiving shareholder to tax
liability under the constructive dividend doctrine. In Carey, two
equal shareholders of a corporation effected a pro rata redemption
of a large portion of capital stock to enable the only available buyer,
who otherwise had insufficient funds, to purchase the stock interest
of the retiring shareholder.' 7 Under these circumstances the Eighth
payments were held to be deductible by the corporation as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses and were not taxable to the remaining shareholder as a constructive
dividend. Id. at 779-81.
2 10 T.C. 19 (1948).
IsId. at 21-22.
" To qualify as a nontaxable reorganization under sections 354 (a) and 368 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the reorganization must be for a bona fide
business purpose. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
15 10 T.C. at 22.
"6289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961).
7Id. at 532-33. By virtue of this pro rata redemption the capital structure of the
corporation was sufficiently decreased to enable an outsider to purchase a 49.4%
interest in the corporation's outstanding stock at a greatly reduced price. Ibid.
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Circuit found a bona fide business purpose and held that the pro
rata redemption was not taxable as a distribution essentially
equivalent to a dividend.'8 On the other hand, had the selling
shareholder individually redeemed a portion of his stock at a price
in excess of market value,19 a constructive dividend might have
been attributed to the remaining shareholder since his agreement
to the redemption amounts to a waiver of his dividend rights in the
corporate surplus used to meet that portion of the redemption price
which exceeds the market value of the shares.2 0 As in Carey, how-
ever, the corporate purpose in this situation seems clear. If the
remaining shareholder does not agree to the unilateral redemption,
the corporation's existence is jeopardized. Therefore, by applying
the Carey rationale the excess would not be taxed to the waiving
shareholder as a constructive dividend.21
It is arguable that a rule which permits the waiver of dividends
to achieve a change of shareholders for a bona fide corporate pur-
pose without incurring the application of the constructive dividend
doctrine should apply even where the parties involved are directly
18 Id. at 538-39. Section 302 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 treats a
corporate stock redemption as a distribution in exchange for stock and thus accords
capital gains treatment to the transaction. Section 302 (b), however, excludes from
such treatment those redemptions of stock which are "essentially equivalent to a
dividend." If section 302 (b) applies, gain to the shareholder on the transaction is
treated as ordinary income. Id. at 535. See generally BITrER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION OF CORPORArbONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 223-34 (student ed. 1959).
"oSee note 20 infra.
Perhaps the shareholder who remains with the corporation might decide that the
maintenance of a certain surplus was essential to the welfare of the corporation
and that a pro rata redemption would impair that surplus. Accordingly, the selling
shareholder might individually redeem a portion of his stock and sell only his re-
maining unredeemed stock to the incoming shareholder.
20 Carey involved a close corporation and there was no true market value for the
shares. This is evidenced by the fact that no interested buyer could be found at
$50,000, the price at which the selling shareholder valued his stock interest. Thus the
use of the term "market value" in this context indicates the value which the share-
holders themselves place upon their stock interest in the corporation. See 289 F.2d
at 532.
21- Analogous to the waiver of dividend problem presented by Revenue Ruling 65-256
is the situation where a shareholder who desires to retain an interest in the cor-
poration agrees to waive his right to dividends for a period of years in order to induce a
third party to buy out the stock interest of a retiring shareholder at a price in excess of
market value. The incoming shareholder is induced to purchase the stock at a higher
price because the waiver of dividends by the shareholder who remains with the corpora-
tion will result in a larger proportional distribution of dividends to the shares
purchased. If no other buyer can be found who is willing to purchase the stock at the
seller's price, a bona fide business purpose arguably exists under the Carey rationale,
since the only alternative open' to the selling shareholder may be to cause the cor-
poration to be liquidated.
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related. In Fred F. Fischer22 a minority shareholder, a sister of the
majority shareholder, threatened to institute receivership proceed-
ings against the corporation and to file a suit contesting the will of
the father of both shareholders and the former manager of the
corporation. To avert this action, the majority shareholder caused
the corporation to redeem his sister's stock at a price in excess of
its book value in release of all her claims against the corporation,
its shareholders and directors..2 3 The court held that the excess paid
the sister above the book value of the stock was not taxable to the
remaining shareholders as a constructive dividend.2 4 According to
the court, the corporation was serving an interest of its own "for the
purpose of promoting harmony in the conduct of the business and
securing it from annoying interference and threats of legal pro-
ceedings."2 5 The fact that the redemption conferred a substantial,
independent benefit on the remaining shareholders did not discredit
this bona fide corporate "interest." 26
Another situation in which the business purpose exception can
arise was presented to the Sixth Circuit in Nelson v. Commissioner,27
In that case payments were made by a corporation to a minority
shareholder, who was the mother of the corporation's president
and majority shareholder, in exchange for the use of a secret
process and an unpatented invention which was valuable in the
22 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 456 (1947).
23 Id. at 457-59. An unarticulated factor in the court's decision was perhaps the fact
that although the shareholders were related, their positions were distinctly adverse.
Ibid.; see note 29 infra.
"Arguably, a constructive dividend could theoretically be attributed to the share-
holders in this situation. The corporation paid the excess of the redemption price over
the book value from corporate earnings or surplus which might otherwise have been
distributed as dividends to the shareholders. Since the shareholders approved of the
payment made for the redeemed stock, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 458, they effectively
waived their right to receive this amount as a dividend distribution in favor of the
additional purchase price paid to the minority shareholder.
2 Id. at 460. For the constructive dividend doctrine to apply, the relative receiving
the financial benefit need not be a shareholder. For example, in Minnie F. Lasker,
21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1952), a mother, who was president and owner of ninety
per cent of the common stock in a corporation, authorized a disbursement to her
daughter, who was not a shareholder, in order to prevent a possible family dispute.
The court found that the payment had not been made for a bona fide business
purpose and taxed it to the mother on a constructive dividend theory. Id. at 40-41.
This case need not be viewed as inconsistent with the result in Fischer since the
benefited relative was not a shareholder and thus not in a position to threaten
corporate dissolution. Absence of this factor lessens the likelihood of the existence
of a bona fide business purpose for the disbursement.
26 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 459-60.
27 203 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1953).
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corporation's manufacturing operations.2 8  Although the effect of
the payments was similar to a waiver of dividends by the majority
shareholders to a minority shareholder-relative, the court refused
to impute dividends to the waiving shareholders. The court in
Nelson did not consider the benefit accruing to a waiving share-
holder's relative significant once a legitimate business purpose had
been found. Rather, the court stated that "regardless of his affec-
tionate motive and inducement of generosity on the part of the cor-
poration toward his mother," the family relationship factor could
not serve to invalidate a transaction that was otherwise "lawfully
impeccable." 29 Exactly what the court meant by its use of this
term is not clear,30 but the Nelson opinion clearly indicates that no
constructive dividend will result when future dividends are waived
as payment to a related shareholder who contributes a valuable
asset in consideration of the waiver, since the purpose for the waiver
meets the business purpose exception.
Another business purpose which a court has recognized as bona
fide was articulated in Ruben v. Commissioner,31 where a corpora-
tion settled a claim on which both the corporation and its three
shareholders were jointly and severally liable. The Eighth Circuit
held that there was no constructive dividend to Ruben, one of the
three shareholders, as the corporation had "its own interest to serve
and ... gained affirmative advantages through a compromise settle-
ment."
32
The question of constructive dividends would also arise in the
Ruben context where a corporation paid a judgment on which fewer
28 Id. at 3. The president held 66.4% of the stock, his brother held 30.8% and
his mother held 1.2%. Ibid.
"Eld. at 6-7. When the potentialities for family cooperation are clearly absent,
as in Fischer, and the interests of the related parties are plainly adverse, judicial
suspicion aroused by the family relationship is ameliorated and the "family rela-
tionship doctrine" loses its force. On the other hand, it is arguable that the family
relationship should be a more controlling factor where harmony exists in situations
such as Nelson. See note 4 supra. In sum, the tenor of family relationship is thus
only a quantum in the factual determination of a legitimate business purpose and
its impact will vary with the situation.
30 The court appeared to use the term in the sense of equivalence in objective
value received by the corporation in consideration for its payments. See 203 F.2d
at 5-6. The meaning of consideration in this context is probably limited to its
objective rather than its subjective sense; that is, a consideration yielding a substantial
corporate benefit in fact. In Nelson, for example, the secret process which the cor-
poration received was used in manufacturing various items in the regular course of
its business, which items constituted the great bulk of its sales. Id. at 1-2.
23197 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1938).
2 Id. at 929.
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than all the shareholders were liable jointly with the corporation.
In such a case the Commissioner might view payment as analogous
to a waiver of dividends by the non-liable shareholders for the benefit
of the liable shareholders. Yet it would appear that since the cor-
poration has "its own interest to serve" and would gain "affirmative
advantages" from payment, such a waiver would be for a bona fide
business purpose and would not constitute a constructive dividend
to the waiving shareholders. This would seemingly hold true even
where the waiving and non-waiving shareholders were directly re-
lated because the same benefit accrues to the corporation in either
case.
33
A fifth type of bona fide business purpose which emerges from
an examination of the case law is the funding of shareholder stock
purchase arrangements through corporate payment of insurance
premiums on the lives of shareholders. In Prunier v. Commis-
sioner 4 the question of a constructive dividend arose when a cor-
poration insured the lives of its two shareholders, the proceeds to
be used by the corporation to purchase the stock interest of which-
ever shareholder died first. In Prunier the two shareholders were
brothers, each of whom owned equal stock interest in the corpora-
tion.31 The First Circuit found that no constructive dividend would
be attributed to either shareholder. The court acknowledged that
such a funding plan served legitimate business purposes by tending
to stabilize the corporation to obtain credit and by inducing key
employees to remain with the corporation. 0
13 Where the corporation is not jointly liable with the shareholders, payment by it
would clearly constitute a constructive dividend. Such a situation arose in Sachs v.
Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1960), where a corporation was owned by four
brothers and a non-relative, one of the brothers holding a one-third stock interest and
serving as the corporation's president. When a fine was incurred by the president
as a result of efforts to evade corporate income taxes, the corporation adopted a reso-
lution that it pay the fine. The court found that the payment was made solely
for the president's benefit and held that a constructive dividend accrued to the
president in the absence of any liability on the part of the corporation. Id. at 880-81,
883-84. As the president was the controlling shareholder, the court did not consider
taxing the remaining, related shareholders on the waiver theory.
3 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
5 Id. at 819.
"'Id. at 822. Compare Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951)
(stock purchase agreement held to be a bona fide business purpose in excess
profits tax context).
Stock purchase agreements funded by insurance policies on the lives of the cor-
poration's shareholders are commonplace in close corporations. See, e.g., Sanders v.
Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958). The stock funding plan makes the close corpora-
tion a much more attractive form of business arrangement. Since the insurance pro.
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Where one of the two shareholders is significantly older than
the other, such insurance payments by the corporation might be
viewed as a waiver of dividends by the older shareholder. Arguably
the payment of premiums by the corporation accrues primarily to
the benefit of the younger shareholder, while the older shareholder
is actually sharing the expense of the purchase price by waiving his
right to receive a proportionate share of the premium payments as
dividends.37 In Revenue Ruling 59-18438 the Service stated that it
will follow the Prunier decision in this context, thereby tacitly
accepting such insurance funding plans as bona fide despite a sig-
nificant benefit to a waiving shareholder's relative. 39
Retirement plans, on the other hand, have not been accorded
the same tax benefit extended to stock purchase plans. In Glenn-
Minnich Clothing Co.,40 the corporation's stock was equally owned
by three shareholders, two of whom were brothers.41 When the three,
all of whom were approaching retirement age, failed to agree on a
company retirement plan, one of the brothers agreed to sell his
stock to the two remaining shareholders for eighty thousand dollars.
As additional consideration, the corporation was to pay twenty
thousand dollars in retirement pay to the selling shareholder and his
ceeds can be used to purchase the interest of the deceased shareholder, corporate
continuity, freedom from interference by potentially disruptive outsiders and general
corporate stability are furthered. 248 F.2d at 822.
37Although such an arrangement clearly benefits the older shareholder by as-
suring a ready market for his shares, this benefit would appear to be outweighed by
benefits accruing to the younger shareholder. By corporate funding of the stock pur-
chase plan, the older shareholder is, in effect, sharing the expense of the higher in-
surance premiums on his life as well as the cost of his stock upon his death. The
stock interest of the younger shareholder in the corporation is thereby greatly in-
creased at only a nominal cost and the appeal to a young businessman of the close
corporation as a form of business entity is greatly enhanced. See note 36 supra.
Thus, the benefits to the younger shareholder from such a funding arrangement ex-
tend significantly beyond the older shareholder's death.
38 1959-1 Cuss. BULL. 65.
30The Fifth Circuit in Paramount-Richards, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602
(5th Cir. 1946), did not approve a similar stock funding plan which ran primarily
to the shareholders' benefit and only incidentally benefited the corporation. In that
case the insurance proceeds were intended to adjust the purchase price of the stock
in the event that a stock option was exercised. Thus the premium payments were
deemed to be merely an appropriation of corporate funds to the shareholders' bene-
fit. Id. at 604. Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 65, follows the Paramount result
and approves such a stock purchase plan to the extent that "the right of the bene-
ficiary to receive the proceeds is conditioned upon the transfer of the corporate
stock to the corporation." Id. at 68. See SURREY & WARREN, op. cit. supra note 4, at
1232.
"029 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1258 (1960).
" Id. at 1260.
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son, an employee.2 The Tax Court found that the payments were
made for the personal benefit of the two remaining shareholders
rather than for a legitimate corporate purpose and imputed a tax-
able dividend to them of ten thousand dollars each.43
Although the Tax Court did not elaborate on its ruling, it
would appear that the failure to find the business purpose bona fide
was based on the rationale that a dispute over an issue such as a
retirement plan has only incidental effect on corporate operations in
that settlement of such a dispute runs primarily to the benefit of the
shareholders. 44 Glenn-Minnich further demonstrates that often the
primary concern of a court is in finding a legitimate corporate pur-
pose, for in that case the court treated as incidental the fact that
benefit accrued to a relative of a waiving shareholder.45
However, when the family relationship is linked with an
elaborate scheme for apparent tax avoidance, a constructive dividend
theory can be applied with some facility to thwart such artifices.
There has been no such disposition in a waiver of dividends con-
text, but analogous applications of a constructive dividend theory
may presage a transplantation into a waiver of dividends con-
text. For example, constructive dividends have been found where
a majority shareholder caused a corporation to purchase gasoline
from a family partnership at prices in excess of what the corpora-
tion paid in purchases from a jobber before the partnership was
created.46 Refusing to recognize these excess payments by the
,2 Id. at 1262-64.
43Id. at 1268-69. See note 44 infra.
"See 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1269. A court might, however, reach a contrary
result if it should find the retirement plan essential to enable the corporation to
continue functioning as a going concern. For example, where it is necessary to
attract new key employees or to prevent dissolution, payments by the corporation
to a retirement fund might be held to have been made for a bona fide corporate
purpose and thus not attributable to the approving shareholders as a constructive
dividend. Compare Tucker v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1955); Marjorie N.
Dean, 10 T.C. 19 (1948).
"529 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1269. The family relationship factor was mentioned
by the court in Glenn-Minnich only in its factual statement of the case. Id. at 1260.
The court focused primarily upon the business purpose for the corporate payments.
Family relationship may have been one of the many factors which the court con-
sidered before holding the two shareholders taxable on the constructive dividend
theory, but there was no indication by the court that this factor was of pivotal
import in its decision. See also Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
6 Byers v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273-74 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 545 U.S.
907 (1953). In Byers, the controlling shareholder of a trucking corporation in which
his wife, nephew, daughter and son held minor stock interests organized a partner-
ship composed of his daughter and son. This partnership then purchased gasoline
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corporation to the partnership as "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses, the court held the majority shareholder taxable on this
excess on the constructive dividend theory.47
Similarly, constructive dividends were found where a husband
and wife, who owned respectively seventy-eight per cent and
twenty-two per cent of the stock in a can company, set up a realty
company in which the husband owned five per cent and the wife
ninety-five per cent.48 By diverting some of the can company's in-
come to the realty company, 49 the husband was able to receive the
benefit of income taxed at a lower rate since his wife was a lower
bracket taxpayer. Because the court found no business purpose
behind the arrangement other than the shifting of taxes, the hus-
band was taxed on realty company income as a constructive dividend
on the basis of his stock holdings in the can company. 50
The family relationship principle has not always provided an easy
solution for the courts. The frequent identity of interests between
a close corporation and its shareholders gives rise to difficulties
in determining motives behind shareholder-corporation transactions
from the same jobber who had previously sold to the corporation and resold it to
the corporation at a price of two cents more per gallon. Ibid.
'
7 Id. at 275.
Also illustrative of a guise courts have heretofore found to be illegitimate is
58th Street Plaza Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1952). Here
a family-owned theatre corporation subleased a theatre to its organizer's wife, who
was also a shareholder, at a rent substantially below the anticipated corporate profits.
Through this means the excess corporate profits tax was avoided and prospective
dividends were siphoned off as income to the wife, whose income was taxed in a
lower tax bracket than that of her husband, the corporation's organizer and controlling
shareholder. The Second Circuit found the lease to be merely a family arrangement
for accomplishing a prospective tax saving and taxed the income received by the wife
via the sublease as a dividend to the wife. Id. at 724-25. While the tax avoidance
scheme was discredited, the decision seems inconsistent with the result reached by
the Service in Rev. Rul. 56-431, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 171, and by several courts. See,
e.g., Byers v. Commissioner, supra note 46. To be consistent, the husband should
have been taxed under the constructive dividend theory on a pro rata portion of
the income diverted to his wife.
However, it is not always necessary to tax the waiving party rather than the
beneficiary of the waiver, as in the situation where there is no possibility that the
waiving party is attempting to shift the tax burden to a lower bracket taxpayer while
retaining control over the property. For an example of a case where the beneficiary
of the waiver was properly taxed, see Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.
1960).
,8 Helvering v. Gordon, 87 F.2d 663, 664-68 (8th Cir. 1937).
41 This diversion of income was accomplished in accordance with an arrangement
between the can company and its supplier whereby "the difference between the
price . . . at which the tin plate was billed . .. and the lower price for which it was
actually purchased was rebated to the Wallace Realty Company." Id. at 664.
11d. at 666-68.
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which result in distinct benefits to both the corporation and rela-
tives of a dominant shareholder.5' As a result, courts have not pri-
marily concerned themselves with motive or intent; rather, they
have utilized an objective test which focuses upon the distribution
of the net economic benefit. 52 Thus, while the existence of the
family relationship may initially invite close judicial scrutiny of a
transaction, the above cases and precedent in analogous areas indi-
cate that the mere existence of this relationship between the waiving
and benefited shareholders may not be sufficient to invoke the
constructive dividend doctrine.53 The family relationship appears
to be but one factor negating the existence of a bona fide business
purpose. Where the waiver of future dividends can be shown to
have independently produced a significant corporate benefit, the
family relationship arguably becomes immaterial. 4 At least where
the related shareholders occupy substantially adverse business in-
terests, the family relationship may no longer serve its purpose
as an indicator that a tax avoidance scheme may be involved. 5 To
this extent, the problem of a waiver of future dividends to a related
shareholder for a business purpose, left unresolved by Revenue
Ruling 65-256, is not insoluble.
On its face, Revenue Ruling 65-256 seems to indicate approval
" Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 649-50 (lst Cir. 1949) (dictum); see, e.g.,
Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1953).
2E.g., Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1960); Helvering v.
Gordon, 87 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1937). See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
What constitutes a "direct" or "substantial" benefit to the corporation is probably
not capable of clear delineation. Determination on a case-by-case basis seems to be
the only practical approach, although findings of an adequate business purpose in
analogous tax areas would seem to have precedential effect for the waiver of future
dividends situation. In this connection see, e.g., Tucker v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d
177 (8th Cir. 1955); Fred F. Fischer, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 456 (1947).
5' See, e.g., Nelson v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1953).
"An examination of the cases indicates that a dividend has not been deemed
constructively received if the evidence suggests a more substantial benefit to the
corporation than to a controlling shareholder's relative, or even if evidence suggests
an equal benefit to both. See, e.g., Fred F. Fischer, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 456 (1947).
However, if the benefit to the corporation is insignificant or incidental and runs
primarily to relatives of a dominant shareholder, then any distribution by the cor-
poration necessary to the accomplishment of the transaction will be taxed to the
waiving shareholder. See, e.g., Minnie F. Lasker, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 40 (1952).
5 See note 29 supra. The existence of the family relationship is more likely to be
material where the legitimacy of the business purpose becomes more questionable. A
related question might further arise as to the extent the benefited relative is a natural
object of the taxpayer's bounty. If that relative is, for example, the taxpayer's
nephew, and the taxpayer has three sons who receive no benefit from a given trans-
action, suspicion as to its bona fides might not arise to the same degree as if a son
of the taxpayer were the "benefited" party.
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of decisions which deny application of the constructive dividend
doctrines where the corporate benefit is clear and the benefits to
relatives of a waiving shareholder are only incidental. There is still
no indication as to whether the Service would tax "dividends waived"
for a bona fide business purpose but resulting in a substantial bene-
fit to non-waiving "related" shareholders.56 Adherence to the family
relationship rule, however, suggests a recognition that transactions
between corporations and shareholders which benefit a share-
holder's relative have in the past been so subject to fraud and at-
tempted tax avoidance that they are inherently suspect. Clarifica-
tion of the requisites for an appropriate business purpose and
delineation of guidelines suggesting the extent to which a family
relationship will result in tax liabilities when future dividends are
waived would thus seem an appropriate area for IRS determination.
Is The question of who is a "related person" for purposes of the constructive
dividend doctrine has not been answered by the code or the courts. Sections 318
and 544 of the Internal Revenue Code relate to constructive stock ownership rules
and suggest some analogies. On the other hand, the family relationship rule might
be more appositely applied whenever the relationship is sufficiently close justifiably to
infer the existence of family cooperation. See note 4 supra.
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